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Police Misconduct, Video Recording, and Procedural Barriers to Rights 
Enforcement  
Howard M. Wasserman† 
 
The story of police reform and of “policing the police” has become the story 
of video and video evidence. “Record everything to know the truth” has become 
the singular mantra and video has become the singular tool for ensuring police 
accountability and reform and for enforcing the rights of victims of police 
misconduct. Video can vindicate the public’s rights against police misconduct, 
assist government in punishing misbehaving officers and departments, and enable 
agencies to reform problematic and constitutionally defective policies and practices. 
From the government’s perspective, video enables officers to prove that their 
conduct was constitutionally appropriate, avoiding civil and criminal liability for the 
officers and the departments. And it allows governments to rebut criticism that it is 
failing to protect the public. 
Three broad categories of video of police-citizen encounters have emerged. 
The first is police-controlled video, including body cameras, dashboard cameras, 
traffic-light cameras, and other government-controlled and -operated surveillance. 
The second is citizen1-controlled video, created from smart phones and cell 
phones, small digital video and audio recorders, private-business surveillance 
cameras, and similar privately owned, controlled, and operated recording 
technology, distributed through blogs and social-networking sites. The third, 
although less-discussed, is live mainstream media coverage of large or breaking 
police-public encounters,2 such as the saturation coverage of the protests cum riots 
in Ferguson in 2014.3 The media also enhances the power and force of the first two 
categories by publicizing and distributing “viral” videos created by other sources. 
Arming everyone, public and private, with recording devices produces a 
balance of power in which all sides record police-public encounters. Big Brother is 
watching the people, but the people are watching Big Brother. Ric Simmons 
recognized the special potential role of citizen-controlled video in ensuring 
government accountability: “It is now evident that Orwell’s vision was wrong. 
Modern technology has turned out to be the totalitarian state’s worst enemy . . . . 
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[I]t is the people who are watching the government, not the other way around.”4  
Mary Fan praises this balanced “modern condition where everyone has incentive to 
record to contest or control the narrative.”5 She explains that 
 
people and the police are recording each other from all directions, 
making everyone at once surveilled and surveillor. I am recording 
you, you are recording me, and the police are recording us too, 
because the people demand it. The lines of power and control 
radiate from all directions as people seek to document their 
perceptions and thus shape the narrative.6 
 
Jocelyn Simonson offers an example of institutionalized mutual surveillance in the 
practice of “organized copwatching—groups of local residents who wear uniforms, 
carry visible recording devices, patrol neighborhoods, and film police-citizen 
interactions in an effort to hold police departments accountable to the populations 
they police.”7 
Multiple constituencies support expanded use of bodycams and similar 
technology as the solution to police misconduct and the source of police reform. 
Fan argues that this universality of support demonstrates the “interest convergence 
thesis,” in which the “convergence of diverse interests across strange bedfellows 
produces major shifts in policy.”8 
Broad public support is reflected in opinion polls9 and in support for a 
WhiteHouse.gov petition shortly after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown and 
corresponding protests in Ferguson, Missouri.10 The Obama Administration and 
the Department of Justice under attorneys general Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch 
promoted video, by police and the public, as a major path to police reform. 
Promotion efforts included grants to law-enforcement agencies to establish or 
enhance body-camera programs, such as $ 75-million award in December 201411 
and a $20-million to 106 agencies in September 2016.12 DOJ entered consent 
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decrees in civil-rights actions13 against police departments in Ferguson14 and 
Baltimore15 that required both departments to establish and maintain effective 
body-camera programs. Federal legislators have offered bodycam proposals.16 A 
2014 joint report by the Department of Justice and the Police Executive Research 
Forum (“PERF”) offered more than 30 recommendations for state and local 
departments establishing body cameras, the central point being that agency policies 
and training materials must provide clear, specific, and detailed guidelines on all 
aspects of the use of cameras.17 The 2015 Final Report of the President’s Task 
Force on 21st-Century Policing highlighted the potential for new policing 
technology, including cameras, as one of the pillars of modern policing and 
recommended expanded study and use.18 The American Civil Liberties Union 
drafted model body-camera legislation, requiring recording of all encounters, 
subject to limited exceptions, with broad disclosure of videos.19 
Two stakeholders do not share this enthusiasm. One is rank-and-file police 
officers and officer unions. While initially supportive, they have backed away, 
concerned with lack of control over the decision when to record and over 
subsequent release and use of the resulting video, which may cause officers 
embarrassment or worse.20 
The more problematic holdout is the Trump Administration and the 
Department of Justice under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who reject the basic 
premise of the need for police reform or the propriety of federal oversight as a 
vehicle for achieving it. Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, the White 
House web page announced a policy of “Standing Up For Our Law Enforcement 
Community.”21 The new Administration would “honor our men and women in 
uniform and . . . support their mission of protecting the public,” and recognized 
that the “dangerous anti-police atmosphere in America is wrong [and] the Trump 
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Administration will end it.”22 Early in his tenure as Attorney General, Sessions 
pledged to pull back from his predecessors’ aggressive use of § 14141 actions and 
consent decrees imposing federal judicial oversight of local police departments, in 
favor of helping police officers better perform their jobs without undermining 
respect for law enforcement or making their jobs more difficult.23 Sessions later 
issued a memorandum identifying a series of principles the department would seek 
to advance, including promoting officer safety, officer morale, and public respect 
for police work.24 It is not clear how body cameras fit the administration’s new 
mission and focus with respect to police reform—whether cameras and video help 
police better perform their jobs or whether they reflect an anti-police attitude and a 
new means of interfering and undermining respect for police. 
The Trump Administration’s recalcitrance on police-controlled recording 
places in stark relief the dramatic and immediate change from the Obama 
Administration with respect to all federal efforts at police reform. The ancien 
administration made extensive use of § 14141 civil actions for equitable relief 
againsy patterns-and-practices of constitutionally violative behavior in state and 
local law-enforcement agencies, obtaining consent decrees against almost twenty 
departments.25 The Trump Administration and Sessions DOJ have rejected the 
premise of federal oversight of local police departments or that patterns-and-
practices of constitutional misconduct exist, as opposed to occasional lone bad 
actors.26 Again, it remains to be seen how that affects the use of police- or citizen-
controlled video. The department sought a 90-day delay so it could reconsider or 
revise the Baltimore consent decree; the district judge refused, insisting that the 
time for negotiation had passed.27 
Citizen-controlled video has become as prominent and essential as police-
controlled video in reform efforts. The Ferguson and Baltimore consent decrees 
required the departments to recognize, respect, and train officers to protect the 
right to “observe and record officers in the public discharge of their duties in all 
traditionally public spaces”28 and to “peacefully photograph or record police 
officers performing their law enforcement duties in public.”29 Ferguson previously 
acknowledged First Amendment protection for the right to record in a consent 
decree resolving a § 1983 action arising from the 2014 protests.30 Six federal courts 
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of appeals—the Eleventh Circuit,31 Ninth Circuit,32 First Circuit,33 Seventh 
Circuit,34 Fifth Circuit,35 and Third Circuit36—have recognized a First Amendment 
right for members of the public to record police and other public officials 
performing their public functions in public spaces. In 2012, DOJ argued in 
litigation that “[r]ecording governmental officers engaged in public duties is a form 
of speech through which private individuals may gather and disseminate 
information of public concern, including the conduct of law enforcement 
officers.”37 
The period of late 2017-2018 offers an opportune moment to consider video 
and its role in police reform, in criminal prosecution, and in civil-rights litigation 
surrounding. 
This year marks significant technological anniversaries.38 The iPhone, which 
has made citizen video pervasive, turned ten in 2017,39 while digital video-recording 
technology, alone and in cell phones, is about 15 years old.40 More than half of 
adults in the United States have smartphones and more than 90% have cell 
phones.41 Dashcam technology was introduced in the late 1980s, but became 
prominent approximately 20 years ago in the early ‘00s, promoted through federal 
funding for recording technology in response to an increase in public assaults on 
officers and in allegations of police abuse.42 Body-camera technology developed in 
Britain in 2005 and came to the United States around 10 years ago.43 
This year also marks significant legal and political anniversaries. The transition 
in civil-rights enforcement commitments from Obama to Trump is in full swing 
more than one year into the Trump presidency. It has been ten years since the 
Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris44 approved summary judgment based on dashcam 
video of a police chase, concluding that video evidence can “speak for itself”45 in 
telling a singular story with which no reasonable jury could disagree.46 It has been 
eight years since publication of the Harvard Law Review article in which Dan 
Kahan, David Hoffman, and Daniel Braman destroyed the underlying premise of 
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Scott, showing that what the Scott video (and, by logical extension, all video) showed 
depended on who was watching.47 And it has been ten years since Simmons’ 
insight, prior to the exponential acceleration of the technological revolution of 
smartphones and body-cams, about Orwell and the power of the public to watch, 
record, and check the government. 
I have written about video evidence, in particular the insistence that body 
cameras offer the solution to the problem of police misconduct. I have described 
my position as uncertain-but-cautious hope and support—cameras are a good idea, 
but the details of how camera programs operate and how video evidence is used in 
litigation and public debate matter.48 The rhetoric surrounding recording of police 
must reflect the reality—the benefits of video and video evidence in providing 
police transparency, accountability, and accuracy in litigation, while perhaps real, 
should not be overstated. And “perhaps” is an important qualifier, as a study of 
body cameras involving more than 2000 officers in Washington, D.C. showed no 
“detectable average effects” on documented uses of force, citizen complaints, or 
behavior by police or citizens in public encounters.49 The more-mixed empirical 
record has not dampened the technological enthusiasm. 
This Article approaches the problem of video evidence and recording of police 
from a different angle. It explores procedural issues surrounding video recording 
and video evidence as they arise in civil50 and criminal51 litigation challenging, ex 
ante or ex post, police misconduct; efforts to hold individual officers or departments 
accountable; and efforts to reform departmental policies, regulations, and practices. 
Part I criticizes the continued belief among courts, government officials, and 
commentators that video “speaks for itself,” the procedural and evidentiary errors 
to which that belief leads, and the problems it creates for civil-rights enforcement. 
Part II considers how video creates evidentiary advantages for the government—
whether prosecution and police in a criminal prosecution or defendant officers in 
civil-rights litigation. Part III explores the promise and limits of citizen-created and 
–controlled video, considering the existence and nature of a First Amendment right 
to record police performing their public duties in public and the problems 
individuals encounter in attempting to enforce and vindicate that right. Part IV 
considers the effects video has outside of litigation; these include executive 
decisions to pursue criminal charges against police officers for misconduct and to 
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settle civil-rights litigation in response to public outrage at a video-recorded 
incident. 
 
I. “Allow the Video to Speak for Itself” 
 
Scott v. Harris was a § 1983 action arising from a high-speed police chase that 
ended when the pursuing officer intentionally rammed the fleeing car, causing it to 
careen off the road and into a ravine, leaving the driver permanently paralyzed.52 
The primary evidence in the record was dashcam video from the pursuing officer’s 
squad car, which the Court posted to its website so it could “speak for itself.”53 
With only Justice Stevens dissenting, the Court held that summary judgment in 
favor of the officer was proper on the driver’s Fourth Amendment claim, because 
the video told only one, “quite . . . different” story from the driver’s testimony—
that the driver, traveling at a high rate of speed and weaving in and out of traffic, 
posed an imminent risk to persons in the immediate area, making constitutionally 
reasonable the use of force to terminate the chase and end the threat to the 
public.54 Video, in the Court’s telling, provided conclusive objective evidence 
telling a singular story. That single story overrode, and allowed the court on 
summary judgment to disregard, all competing evidence, including the victim’s 
testimony that he was driving safely (if fast) and did not pose a threat to the public 
because the roads were empty.55 The Court could disregard that testimony because 
it was “blatantly contradicted” by the record56—that is, by the video, which 
possessed one objective, obvious meaning that a court could determine and that no 
reasonable jury could understand differently, regardless of how it judged the 
victim’s testimony and credibility. 
Scott fundamentally misunderstood video and video evidence. Video does not 
possess a singular meaning or present a singular story to all viewers that obviates a 
factfinder or allows the court such leeway on summary judgment. Video functions 
as any other piece of evidence—it captures and offers limited information and its 
meaning must be processed and understood by whoever views or hears that 
information.57 
From the front end of what video presents comes the insight familiar to every 
undergraduate film student—what video “says” or “means” is limited by what is 
inside and outside the camera’s frame, what is included or not included in the 
image, and the “camera’s perspective (angles) and breadth of view (wide shots and 
focus).”58 The meaning of a video changes with the length of the video, steadiness 
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of the camera,59 and other details of the recording, such as distances, perspectives, 
light, color, sound, sound quality, visual quality, and angles.60 “All films have a 
point of view or voice,”61 but the voice and story change from different angles, 
details, and perspectives reflected in different videos.62 
The back end recognizes that video, like any other piece of evidence, must be 
processed, interpreted, and understood by the factfinder.63 The work of Dan 
Kahan and his co-authors at Yale’s Cultural Cognition Project64 has explored and 
revealed the nature of and influences on that interpretation. Their empirical studies 
have exposed the fallacy of Scott and those who insist that video offers an absolute 
truth or singularity. They show that video does not speak for itself; what video 
“says” depends on who is watching and the “priors” each viewer brings with her. 
Video’s meaning is affected by a complex combination of cultural, demographic, 
social, political, racial, gender, ideological, and experiential characteristics. That is, 
reasonable jurors could disagree about the meaning of a video because that 
meaning is influenced, if not determined, by the personal and political 
characteristics each juror brings to her task of viewing, interpreting, and 
understanding.65 
Two Kahan studies are particularly relevant to this discussion. The first is the 
original 2009 study in Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe, in which researchers took 
the Court up on its offer to let video speak for itself by showing the chase video to 
study participants. While the majority of viewers in the study interpreted the Scott 
video as the Court did, the minority of viewers who disagreed with the Court’s 
view shared demographic and ideological characteristics and “a distinctive 
understanding of social reality that informs their views of the facts.”66 The second 
study is They Saw a Protest, in which the authors showed video depicting a crowd 
outside a building that was alternately identified as a reproductive-health clinic or a 
military recruitment center during the period in which openly LGBT persons were 
barred from military service. Opinions about abortion and about LGBT rights 
corresponded with whether a viewer saw a peaceful-but-emphatic protest or a riot 
and threatening blockade of the building.67 
Both studies explain public reactions to high-profile video cases. Viewer 
positions and experiences on race, class, law-and-order, and the theory of “broken 
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windows” policing influence interpretations of video of the strangulation death of 
Eric Garner at the hands of New York City Police Officer Daniel Pantaleo.68 
Reactions to video of protests and police attempts to break-up protests—in 
Ferguson and elsewhere following the shooting death of Michael Brown,69 the 
non-indictment of Officer Darren Wilson in the Brown shooting,70 or in St. Louis 
following the 2017 acquittal of Officer Jason Stockley in the shooting death of 
Anthony Lamar Smith71—track viewer positions on law-and-order, the freedom of 
speech, the propriety of public protest in public spaces, and, likely, the underlying 
events and judicial decisions being protested.72 A viewer who believes that the 
protested shooting was wrongful and that public protest is essential First 
Amendment activity promoting social change is more likely to see a constitutionally 
protected peaceful protest broken up by over-zealous police; a viewer who believes 
the shooting was justified is more likely to see outnumbered police struggling to 
maintain order against a lawless riot. 
Nevertheless, courts and commentators continue to espouse Scott’s mistaken 
position on the “truth” of recording evidence and how it can be used in litigation. 
Video continues to be treated as an objective, unbiased, transparent observer of 
events that evenhandledly reproduces reality for the viewer, providing raw, 
unambiguous, and unbiased evidence showing conclusively and certainly what 
happened in the real world. Courts continue to use video to relieve themselves of 
traditional reliance on one-sided testimony to reconstruct events, to find a 
necessary check on the fallibility of human perception, and to allow factfinders to 
replay and perceive events free of adverseness, passion, and partisanship that 
plagues traditional witness testimony.73 Video continues to be seen as more likely 
to be “much more accurate than other means of conveying information,” which 
“increases the credibility and reliability of expression but also may allow more 
information to be translated quickly in a manner unfiltered by a third-party 
account.”74 In recognizing a First Amendment right to record, the Third Circuit 
argued that “to record what there is the right for the eye to see or the ear to 
hear corroborates or lays aside subjective impressions for objective facts. Hence to 
record is to see and hear more accurately.”75 
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The problem is a failure to distinguish persuasiveness from moral certainty. 
Video may be a more “credible representation of reality” that can “persuade all the 
more powerfully, generating less counterargument and retaining the viewers’ 
belief.”76  Video can “validate or undermine” accounts of events and “help resolve 
the conflict not only for the parties immediately involved but also in the interests 
of the broader community.”77 But courts must resist what literature scholar Peter 
Brooks calls the “reality effect,” the idea that video is, in and of itself, the thing or 
event depicted, rather than one more piece of evidence of the thing depicted that a 
factfinder can consider and use.78 The failure to distinguish the concepts 
undermines the process in which courts resolve disputes. 
The Supreme Court repeated its mistake, this time unanimously, in Plumhoff v. 
Rickard.79 The Court again approved summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
officers on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim arising from a high-speed 
chase, again understanding the dashcam video as telling one obvious story of the 
plaintiff posing a grave risk to public safety that officers properly terminated with 
deadly force, even at the risk of serious injury or death to the “fleeing” motorist.80 
As in Scott, the Court accepted the video in the record to show conclusively that the 
plaintiff posed a threat to the public with his “outrageously reckless” driving.81 The 
video “conclusively disprove[d]” the plaintiff’s allegations about whether the chase 
was over, whether he intended to resume flight, and whether he still was 
maneuvering the car.82 And the video showed that the driver was “obviously 
pushing down on the accelerator” and that he threw the car into reverse “in an 
attempt to escape.”83 The Court could decide this from its review of the video, 
with no further proceedings or factfinder consideration necessary or appropriate. 
Plumhoff did not acknowledge the role of video in its decision, as had Scott. Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion recited facts and described what happened during the 
chase, without identifying video as the source of its facts or conclusions or placing 
the video on the Court website for the public to watch and consider. Only 
references to video during argument84 and the Court’s reliance on Scott as 
controlling precedent indicated video’s prominent role in the case. 
The evidentiary limits of video become clear in cases with multiple or 
competing videos. Several studies show that a second video, taken from a different 
and often broader angle, tells a different, often contradictory, story than does a 
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single, narrow body-camera video.85 There is a reason that every witness to an 
incident or to police activities has her phone out—each wants to create and keep a 
unique record of events because each resulting video is a unique piece of 
evidence.86 But if different videos of the same occurrence can tell different stories 
depending on the internal elements of that video—especially a different angle or 
different width of visual field—no one video can be correct or tell the entire story. 
During argument in 2017’s Hernandez v. Mesa,87 the Court ignored an example 
that should have shown how courts have gone astray in their reliance on video. 
Hernandez was a Bivens action against a border-patrol officer arising from a cross-
border shooting—the officer was standing in the United States when he fired, 
while the victim, a Mexican national, was standing at or near the Rio Grande 
culvert marking the U.S./Mexico border. The officer was cleared by a departmental 
investigation.88 The incident was captured by several surveillance cameras, with one 
video from one camera circulating on YouTube. During argument, the following 
exchange occurred between Justice Sotomayor and counsel for the United States: 
 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- go back to my hypothetical. Border 
policemen are shooting indiscriminately from within the United 
States across the border. This is the allegation in this complaint. 
And I understand you say the government has investigated and 
sees the facts differently. Have you seen the – the film that 
appeared on the YouTube?  
MR. KNEEDLER: I have.  
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I did, and I can't square the police 
officer's account of this incident with that film.  
MR. KNEEDLER: There were other videos. The -- the -- the 
press release -- nothing in the record and nothing in a -- in a public 
account -- * * * ---there was other evidence and other video-
surveillance videos that were taken into account in the 
investigation.89 
 
Unfortunately, everyone missed the point and its significance for the debates 
over cameras and video evidence. If other videos could justify a different result in 
the departmental investigation despite adverse video, no single video can be 
conclusive as a matter of law. Every video offers one unique perspective out of 
multiple perspectives on one story, none necessarily truer than another.90  If other 
(non-video) evidence could justify a different outcome in the departmental 
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investigation despite the adverse video, then contradicting non-video evidence 
should play a similar role in civil-rights litigation, precluding summary judgment 
based on the court’s singular view of what video says and disregard for contrary 
non-video evidence. As a court on summary judgment cannot choose between 
competing witness accounts,91 so should it not choose between competing videos 
or between competing video and testimonial evidence. A litigation factfinder 
should be given an opportunity to review all of disparate pieces of evidence, 
determine their meaning and credibility, and make its decision. 
The public reaction to the outcomes of prosecutions of police officers in cases 
involving publicly disclosed body-cam and dashcam evidence illustrates the error of 
Scott and the correctness of Kahan’s insights that video can have multiple 
reasonable meanings and messages.92 In a string of notorious cases, officers have 
been not charged or not convicted in shooting cases where the incident was 
recorded and the judicial decision contradicted the wider public perception of the 
video, triggering public outrage, protests, and demonstrations.93 Accepting that the 
public was not protesting the outcome simpliciter—a white police officer was not 
convicted of shooting an African-American person, ergo the outcome was unjust 
and grounds for protest—the anger  must have been based on different 
perceptions and understandings of the video evidence. And those different 
perceptions and understandings derived from the viewers’ distinct demographics, 
political attitudes, and life experiences that Kahan and his co-authors identified as 
influencing viewer understanding of video. That the public could disagree with the 
grand jury, jury, or judge means video cannot be singular—either different viewers 
reached different conclusions about the meaning of the video or other evidence 
changed the prevailing view of the video in the formal proceeding. Either way, 
video did not present the single truth, but could be and was overcome by 
something beyond the images themselves. 
It is not clear who reached the “correct” or “accurate” result in these cases—
the non-convicting factfinders or the righteously indignant public.94 It does not 
matter. The point is that video is subjective and the assumption of the video’s 
objective singularity is wrong. 
The judicial process must recognize and incorporate this insight, as judges are 
uniquely equipped to do.95 Courts cannot throw away the ordinary rules of 
evidence and procedure when video is part of the record. A court on summary 
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judgment cannot view the evidence “in the light depicted by the videotape”96 
because the videotape lacks a singular meaning in which other evidence can be 
viewed. The video, as with any other piece of evidence, must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment because the jury (or 
individual jurors) may (and statistically, some will) view the video differently than 
the court, based on their attitudes and experiences. And none of those competing 
viewpoints should be boxed or rejected as unreasonable. 
That insight applies beyond summary judgment. It is true that at most trials, 
video evidence will prevail with factfinders over competing testimonial evidence, 
who see it a more salient than verbal descriptions.97 But Kahan’s studies about 
viewer interpretation and scholarship about how video forms and presents its 
message remain significant at trial. They should remind courts that the place for 
subjective interpretations of video and comparison with non-video evidence is a 
trial before a factfinder, not summary judgment that preempts the ordinary civil-
litigation process and labels competing understandings of video unreasonable.98 
They also should remind factfinders in civil and criminal proceedings not to place 
blind faith in video, but to recognize its limitations and its connections with and 
complementarity to non-video evidence. Factfinders must decide the case in light 
of all the evidence, including their subjective interpretation in understanding and 
applying video evidence. 
 
II. Evidentiary Advantages for Law Enforcement 
 
Commentators have described the evidentiary advantages that police officers 
enjoy in litigation, as witnesses in criminal prosecutions against arrestees and as 
defendants in civil and criminal proceedings.99 Judges and juries tend to view 
officer’s testimony as more credible than that of citizens in a he-said/he-said 
contest between one police officer and one suspect,100 an “ugly battle” that is 
“highly imbalanced in power.”101 Judges and juries are reluctant to openly discredit 
law-enforcement officer testimony, where an adverse finding that the officer is 
lying or is not credible could destroy a career.102 
Advocates argue that video evidence can overcome that imbalance by offering 
objective information that does not depend on credibility determinations or the 
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subjectivity of adversary proceedings.103 But that tendency to believe law-
enforcement testimony has migrated into how courts view video evidence, with the 
jury or court (on summary judgment) more likely to adopt police officers’ asserted 
interpretation of the video’s singular meaning and story, at the expense of a 
competing narrative of the video’s meaning. The Court did this on summary 
judgment in Scott and Plumhoff. Lower courts grant summary judgment for officers 
by relying on ambiguous or apparently police-friendly video104 or by ignoring 
adverse video.105 This tendency accompanies a shift in law enforcement’s view of 
the purpose of police-controlled video—not to reveal official wrongdoing or gain 
government accountability, but to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions of 
members of the public.106 
The 2017 acquittal of former St. Louis police officer Michael Stockley 
illustrates the tendency. Stockley was charged in state-court with murder arising 
from the shooting death of Anthony Lamar Smith following a high-speed chase. 
The case presented numerous recording-evidence issues. Dashcam video of the 
chase captured Stokely telling his partner “we’re killing this motherfucker, count on 
it” during the chase. Video of the aftermath of the chase showed Stockley walking 
to the victim’s car, firing five shots, returning to his squad car and rifling through a 
bag, then returning to Smith’s car. At that point, another officer turned the 
dashcam off, leaving only a blurry cellphone video, taken by a bystander, as 
evidence. That citizen-controlled video did not clearly show whether Stockley was 
carrying a second gun (the prosecution alleged that Stockley planted a gun in 
Smith’s car to set-up a self-defense defense).107 
In a bench trial, the judge resolved every video issue in Stockley’s favor. 
Comments about “killing” Smith were ambiguous, a means of releasing tension 
during the chase rather than a statement of intent. The court drew no adverse 
inferences from officers turning the dashcam off or from Stockley violating 
department procedure in rifling through a bag in his car or moving back and forth 
between Smith’s car and the squad car. And the ambiguity of the citizen video 
meant that government had not proven that Stockley planted a second gun.108 
The Sixth Circuit took a similarly officer-centric approach to video on 
summary judgment in Marvin v. City of Taylor.109 The case involved claims of 
excessive force arising from the arrest of the plaintiff on a DUI charge and his 
transportation to the police station. Events at the station house were videotaped, 
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and the court relied on the videos as the sole touchstone for its factual analysis in 
reversing the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.110 
But the court went a step beyond Scott. It demanded that the video 
affirmatively corroborate plaintiff’s testimony and show what the court viewed as 
excessive force; it felt free to ignore plaintiff testimony because the court’s view of 
the video did not affirmatively support that testimony. The plaintiff alleged that 
one of the defendant officers pulled him out of the car at the station house and 
threw him to the ground, but the court insisted that the video did not clearly show 
this and refused to credit the plaintiff’s testimony as a supplement. The video, 
taken from the opposite side of the car and not offering an unobstructed view, 
only showed the officer opening the door, reaching into the car, closing the door, 
then bending down and helping the plaintiff to his feet; it did not show the officer 
“abusing” the plaintiff. Although the video, as understood, did not blatantly 
contradict the plaintiff’s assertions as in Scott, it did not support them. And by not 
supporting his version, it “certainly cast[] strong doubts on [his] 
characterization.”111 Plaintiff’s testimony was not enough. 
Marvin also testified that the officers had gratuitously pulled his injured arm 
into the small of his back while taking off the handcuffs from behind. According to 
the court, while the video appeared to show the plaintiff’s arms being raised into 
the small of his back, the officer also could be seen crouching when inserting the 
key to unlock the cuffs, presumably to avoid making the plaintiff raise his arms. 
Based on (the judges’ interpretation of) the video, the court concluded that “the 
officers’ conduct cannot reasonably be construed as gratuitous.”112 The possibility 
of an officer-favorable interpretation of the video justified the court adopting that 
interpretation and granting summary judgment for the officers. 
The competing inferences from one video and between video and testimony 
could work against law enforcement and in favor of members of the public 
challenging police conduct, as the 2017 prosecution of police-reform activist 
Cristina Winsor illustrates. Winsor was acquitted of misdemeanor charges of 
disorderly conduct and walking in a roadway, stemming from her arrest during a 
police-reform protest in New York City. The state trial judge found bystander-
citizen video showed something “totally different” from what officers said 
happened.113 
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Winsor’s case is unique and telling in several respects. The judge viewed the 
officers as “quite credibl[e]” on “first blush,”114 reflecting the common judicial 
tendency and turning only after the judge viewed the video. The more common 
case moves in the other direction—video may look bad for the officer (as do many 
videos of violent encounters and police use of force),115 but is overcome by the 
officer’s testimony as to his belief about things not necessarily shown in the video 
or his explanation and justification for what the video seems to show. 
The contradictions between the officers’ testimony and the video of the 
protest at which Winsor was arrested were obvious and objective. The conflicts did 
not revolve around issues of discretion, judgments of what was reasonable in the 
moment, or questions of what the officer might have subjectively feared from the 
suspect. They were about objective elements in the video such as scaffolding 
blocking the sidewalks (the officers said there was none, while the video showed 
some)116 or the presence of white-shirted officers (the officers said none were 
present, while the video showed an officer wearing a white shirt making an 
arrest).117 These video images required less interpretation, so were less subject to 
demographic factors affecting perception and interpretation, compared with video 
of events that might or might not be a peaceful protest or that might or might not 
constitute excessive force. 
The stakes in play in a proceeding also affect how a trial court approaches and 
interprets video, as it does other evidentiary and legal judgments.118 Judges and 
juries may be willing to view the video differently, and less favorably to law 
enforcement, in a misdemeanor summons case such as Winsor compared with a 
high-value § 1983 action for excessive force by a plaintiff killed119 or seriously 
injured120 or a prosecution of a police officer for murder arising from performance 
of his dangerous duties in a dangerous situation.121 
The evidentiary advantage may be enhanced when officers fail to utilize police-
controlled video technology. In her study of the frequency of police failures to 
record, Fan finds that officers often fail to follow departmental regulations for 
police-controlled recording, fail to record events, or fail to record them fully and 
completely.122 Removing video from the evidentiary record returns the factfinding 
weight to competing testimony, restoring the potential officer advantage. 
Fan’s solution to the problem is to undo the evidentiary benefit. She proposes 
that courts exclude partial or incomplete recordings (where the officer improperly 
failed to record all appropriate portions of the encounter) and impose a positive 
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inference that the missing video would have provided information supporting the 
member of the public (whether as defendant in a criminal prosecution or plaintiff 
in a civil action) and running against the officer. This places a thumb on the 
evidentiary scale in favor of the public’s civil rights, without requiring courts to find 
that the officer intentionally hid or destroyed evidence of misconduct.123 
 
III. Citizen Video, the First Amendment, and the Problem of Rights 
Enforcement 
 
The trend is towards less publicly visible police-created video rather than 
more—narrowing both the frequency of camera use and the availability of video. 
The 2014 PERF Report recommended that departmental policies give officers 
discretion over when to record, the position that most departments have 
adopted.124 Most departments surveyed adopted a “limited discretion model;” 
officers were required to record certain enforcement activities and given discretion 
whether to record others, but given no guidance about whether or when to record 
consensual encounters, the incidents in which many violations occur.125 In Michael 
White’s words, if recording is not mandated, an incident will not be recorded.126 
That approach comports with the preferences of rank-and-file officers.127 Police 
departments and governments also have resisted making the resulting videos 
broadly available, adopting “blanket, overly broad exemptions from public 
disclosure.”128 State and local governments have exempted dashcam and bodycam 
videos from open-records or FOIA laws,129 with departments using video more for 
internal training than for public awareness of police activity or for establishing 
police liability and accountability to the public. 
Exacerbating that problem is officers failing to record (or to record fully and 
completely), even when required to do so by laws and department regulations.130 
Studies and departmental investigations have revealed officers turning off or failing 
to engage cameras, whether erroneously or intentionally, resulting in non-recording 
or selective and partial recording of events.131 Formal departmental policies, even 
those requiring broader recording, yield to officer practices on the ground, 
undermining the accountability and transparency goals and amplifying the “gross 
imbalance of power” between police and the public.132 Fan’s proposal for requiring 
courts to adopt inferences adverse to the government where video is 
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inappropriately unavailable reduces some government incentive to limit the amount 
of video.133 
The answer to decreased police-controlled video—whether because of narrow 
departmental recording regulations or because of officer disregard for those 
regulations—must be increased citizen-created and-controlled video to fill the gap. 
It ensures that there will be recordings of many police-public encounters regardless 
of departmental policies or officers’ conformity with policies. But citizen-video fills 
those gaps only if members of the public are constitutionally entitled and 
practically able to record police activity and their interactions with officers. And 
that may prove more difficult than it appears. 
Six federal courts of appeals agree that the First Amendment grants individuals 
the right to record police and other officials in the course of performing their 
public duties in public spaces—Eleventh Circuit,134 Ninth Circuit,135 First 
Circuit,136 Seventh Circuit,137 Fifth Circuit,138 and Third Circuit.139 The lone 
contrary view came from Judge Posner dissenting in the Seventh Circuit, arguing 
that the privacy concerns of the individuals interacting with police in the recordings 
should prevail over any First Amendment interests the recorder may claim in 
hearing and electronically capturing that interaction.140 But Seth Kreimer argues 
that at least the early decisions recognized the right to record by assertion more 
than by explanation or argument.141 Several scholars have gone beyond the courts 
to identify the source, nature, and scope of the constitutional right to record. No 
single free-speech theory links these arguments. But each offers a sound theoretical 
basis for some constitutional right to record. 
 
 
A. Toward a First Amendment Right to Record 
The First Amendment does and should protect a citizen’s right to record 
police performing public functions in public. The goal in this Article is not to take 
or defend a normative position on the right or to evaluate the bases that courts or 
scholars have used to support that right. Taking as a given the existence of the 
right as elaborated by courts and commentators, this Part considers the problems 
in recognizing, enforcing, and vindicating that right, whatever its nature, source, 
and scope. 
 
1. Scholarly Arguments 
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This section considers five leading scholarly arguments for the right. 
 
a. Seth Kreimer. Kreimer explores the expressive landscape created and defined 
by the emergence of “pervasive image capture,” the combination of digital 
photography, pervasive cell-phone cameras, and online venues for image sharing. 
The result is that 
 
almost any image we observe can be costlessly recorded, freely 
reproduced, and instantly transmitted worldwide. We live, relate, 
work, and decide in a world where image capture from life is 
routine, and captured images are part of ongoing discourse, both 
public and private. Capture of images has become an adjunct to 
memory and an accepted medium of connection and 
correspondence.142  
 
Like words inscribed on parchment, captured images are expressive, part of 
the cultural and political discourse. First Amendment protection attaches to all 
such expressive images, whether used publicly or whether the individual creates the 
images with the intent to use them. Pervasive image capture allows individuals to 
record and reflect on their memories and experiences, an essential component of 
the freedom of thought the First Amendment guarantees.143 And the technological 
ease of capturing and recording those images cannot be disaggregated from the 
technological ease of disseminating them, as both are part of a “broader digital 
ecology of communication.”144 
Citizen recording is constitutionally essential to balance official police-
controlled recording. Images are often more salient than verbal descriptions—
which is to say more powerful in their persuasive ability,145 not necessarily more 
accurate or more singular in meaning. “Participants in public dialogue who are 
barred from capturing images are at a substantial discursive disadvantage vis-à-vis 
those who can record from life. Officials engage in virtually unchecked surveillance 
of public encounters. A rule that bars citizens from capturing images gives 
unbalanced authority to official framing.”146 
 
b. Justin Marceau and Alan Chen. Building off Kreimer’s argument about 
advancements in digital recording and distribution, Marceau and Chen argue that 
this “creates transformative ways for individuals to participate in democracy and 
inform public discourse about not only political and social issues but also broader 
understandings about the truths of the universe, including complex moral 
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questions,” such as abortion, food safety, and police misconduct.147 Recording 
“add[s] to the body of knowledge about the most controversial aspects of 
contemporary society.”148 And if recording itself is not a species of expression, 
image capture is conduct that is “essential to speech;” as writing, speaking, and 
other conduct used for expression are speech, so is the creation and production of 
images that may be exhibited and viewed.149 
Marceau and Chen define the scope of the right to vary by context. The 
Constitution protects the right to record in locations where the recorder has a legal 
right to be present.150 This includes publicly accessible spaces, on one’s own private 
property, on another’s property with that owner’s consent or knowledge, and on 
private property without consent where the recording pertains to a matter of public 
concern or has a strong connection to public discourse.151 The right remains 
subject to reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.152 And 
it may yield to government interests, including protection of personal privacy,153 
although nondisruptive recording in public (the paradigm for recording police 
officers perfroming police functions) should remain immune from government 
regulation.154 
 
c. Carol Rice Andrews. Writing before the 21st-century explosion of citizen-
recording technology, Andrews grounds a right to record in the First Amendment’s 
Petition Clause, identifying a core right to file winning civil-rights claims against 
government officials in court.155 That right to seek and obtain legal remedies from 
government officials through formal government channels is at least as important 
as the right to engage in general public speech about those officials.156 The Petition 
right also requires “breathing room,” in the form of broader protections for related 
non-core petition activities.157 One non-core activity is the right to file losing civil-
rights suits as a buffer for the core right of filing winning suits.158 That is, an 
individual can file winning suits only if she remains free to file all suits and to risk 
losing. 
A second non-core right should be recording the public police misconduct that 
gives rise to those winning civil-rights claims by those injured by that misconduct, 
whether the recording is created by the injured person or by a bystander observing 
the encounter. Either provides evidentiary value for subsequent litigation. 
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Recording both “captures” the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the winning 
claim and “preserves” evidence of the event that will be necessary to proving that 
winning claim. 
 
d. Jane Bambauer. Bambauer begins from the premise that the First Amendment 
protects the “creation of knowledge. Expanded knowledge is an end goal of 
American speech rights, and accurate information, along with other, more 
subjective expressions, provides the fuel.”159 She defines a negative “right to create 
knowledge” as a “latent prerequisite for free expression. Speech does very little for 
a government’s constituents if it is not supported by commitments to free thought 
and information flow.”160 This right ensures that government will not interfere 
unduly with its constituents learning.161 
Protecting the creation of knowledge includes protecting electronic data as 
speech.162 Speaking of photography with reasoning that applies to live-action video 
and audio recording, Bambauer argues that the First Amendment protects the 
photographs or other recordings, not the act of creating those recordings. The 
“very purpose of a photography ban is to prevent a wider audience from seeing the 
scene” photographed, so a government-imposed restriction or ban on photos (and 
necessarily on video- and audio-recording) must be understood, and declared 
invalid, as “designed to cut down on communicative potential.”163 A “law 
prohibiting the creation, maintenance, or distribution of digital information 
attempts to achieve its social goals by limiting the accumulation of knowledge. 
Data privacy laws strive to give individuals the power to decide who does and does 
not get to learn about them.”164 
 
e. Jud Campbell. Campbell defines “speech-facilitating conduct” as conduct, 
often non-expressive, that facilitates or enables speech.165 He argues for a negative 
“anti-targeting rule,” under which laws regulating non-expressive conduct raise 
free-speech problems when singling out and targeting speech or the speech 
process.166 This anti-targeting rule best explains protection for recording: 
 
Cameras and other audiovisual recording devices are conventional 
means of communication—that is, they are conventionally used for 
communicative purposes. Targeted regulations of audiovisual 
recording thus single out conduct commonly associated with 
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expression and impose an apparent disproportionate burden on 
speech.167 
 
Campbell praises the Seventh Circuit decision in Alvarez that enjoined 
enforcement of a state eavesdropping statute as applied to listening to and 
recording of police officers performing public functions in public.168 The statute 
operated “at the front end of the speech process by restricting the use of a 
common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of communication.”169 The Seventh 
Circuti recognized that the statute burdened First Amendment rights “directly, not 
incidentally,” by “specifically targeting a communication technology.”170 On 
Campbell’s model, the law targeted communication technology that, even if not 
expressive in every use, had “readily apparent disproportionate effects on 
speech.”171 
 
2. Recent Judicial Decisions 
 
In 2017, two courts of appeals sought to move beyond Kreimer’s criticism that 
the right to record had been announced but not explained, by locating the right to 
record within existing First Amendment doctrinal and scholarly norms. 
The Fifth Circuit identified the right as an amalgam of the right to film, the 
right to gather information, and the right of listeners to receive information.172 The 
Third Circuit also placed it within the First Amendment right to access information 
about official activities—recording is one way to observe, see, and hear what 
officers do in public more accurately.173 That court also emphasized what Vincent 
Blasi labeled the First Amendment’s “checking function” on government 
misconduct, under which the press and public speak as a means to check, expose, 
and stop government misconduct.174 Citizen-controlled video offers new and 
different perspectives that compete with official versions of events, enabling 
members of the public to perform a role similar to that of the news media.175 
Both courts also acknowledged the increase in police-controlled recording.  
Citizen-controlled video supplemented other video in spurring departmental 
change, aiding and furthering investigations of wrongdoing, and confirming dead-
ends where no wrongdoing occurred.176 
                                                     
167 Id. 50-51 
168 Alvarez, 679 F.3d 586. 
169 Id. at 589. 
170 Id. at 602-03. 
171 Campbell, supra note ___, at 53. 
172 Turner, 848 F.3d at 687-90. 
173 Fields, 862 F.3d at 359. 
174 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 
609-10. 
175 Fields, 862 F.3d at 359-60; Wasserman, Video, supra note ___, at 615-16 
176 Fields, 862 F.3d at 359-60; Turner, 848 F.3d at 689. 
By framing the right in this way, the Third Circuit removed from the 
constitutional calculus whether the recording citizen intended to disseminate or use 
the resulting video. Requiring intent would produce too-limited a right. Intent to 
publish may develop only later, once the recorder has an opportunity to review the 
recording and to reflect on the story the video tells (in his subjective and politically 
determined view). It makes no constitutional sense to allow officers to prevent an 
individual from recording based on that individual’s present intent, thereby 
depriving her of the opportunity to develop different intent to put the recording to 
expressive use once she knows more about the recording and the events captured 
and reflected in that recording.177  
Nevertheless, the way courts have defined the right to record produces an odd 
paradox. Government officials have a perverse incentive to record or to require 
recording of as few encounters as possible and to disclose as little video as 
possible, whether through policies, officer discretion, or officer disregard for their 
regulatory obligations. Uniform recognition of a First Amendment right to record 
would seem to restore the balance. If officers do not record and preserve a record, 
members of the public will. But police officers have a complementary incentive 
also to limit public recording or disclosure by involved citizens and bystanders, 
thereby removing any video or audio record of an encounter. 
Those incentives combine to eliminate any record of a police-public encounter 
gone wrong, leaving proof to the he-said/he-said testimony that routinely favors 
police and government officials. And procedural limitations on civil rights litigation 
may mean that the mere fact of constitutional protection for citizen-controlled 
recording may be insufficient to overcome perverse incentives or to prevent a 
determined government or individual officer from deterring or stopping all 
recording by all sources.  
 
B. The Problem of Qualified Immunity 
 
Constitutional challenges to police efforts to prevent a citizen from 
recording—constitutional claims to vindicate the First Amendment right to 
record—typically arise in § 1983 actions seeking damages for past, completed rights 
violations. 
In the typical right-to-record case, officers prevented an individual from 
recording a completed encounter, then the individual sues the officer and/or the 
municipality for which the officer worked for damages. Where no other 
proceedings would allow them to assert their First Amendment rights, recording 
plaintiffs may find that it is “damages or nothing.”178 In most cases, the recorder 
was not arrested or charged for attempting to record.179 Or the recorder was 
released after a brief “conversation,” likely designed to deter the person from 
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attempting to record again.180 Or the recorder was arrested, but charges were 
withdrawn when the arresting officer, recognizing their speciousness, did not 
appear at the state proceeding181 or when the basis for the charges was revealed to 
be invalid in that proceeding.182 
The Fifth Circuit cited this procedural posture to justify taking the odd (and 
arguably inappropriate) step of determining and announcing the scope of the First 
Amendment right as clearly established “for the future,” without determining 
whether the officers actually violated the plaintiff’s rights at the time and on the 
facts at issue in the case.183 It feared this case or a procedurally similar damages 
action provided the only opportunity to address the constitutional issue. 
But executive officials, such as police officers, can avoid litigation and liability 
on all claims for constitutional damages through the defense of qualified immunity. 
Qualified immunity provides that a government official can be liable for damages 
only for conduct that violated a constitutional right that was clearly established, 
such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated the 
constitutional right at issue.184 No officer in the Fifth or Third Circuit cases was 
held liable; all were granted qualified immunity, because the right to record was not 
clearly established at the time of the challenged events.185 This followed two Third 
Circuit decisions in which the court pretermitted analysis of the merits of the First 
Amendment question and held that any constitutional right that might exist had 
not been clearly established.186 
The Supreme Court has made qualified-immunity doctrine strongly protective 
of police officers, particularly on Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure and 
excessive-force claims, to the point that it has become difficult-to-impossible to 
establish officer liability.187 It has held that police officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity in almost a dozen cases in the past decade, several of them summary 
reversals.188 Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent and those 
who knowingly violate rights.”189 A right is “clearly established” only by a strong 
consensus of lower-court cases with somewhat similar facts and officers acting in 
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similar circumstances, defining the right in light of the facts of which the defendant 
officer was aware and not at too high a level of generality.190 The Court has been 
coy about whether one binding decision from a regional circuit is sufficient to 
clearly establish within that circuit, assuming it might but never finding the right 
clearly established based on a single case.191 Policies of the relevant executive 
department may provide officers with notice of clearly established law.192 A right 
also may be so obvious that it can be clearly established as general principle 
without factually similar precedent,193 but the bar for obviousness is high.194 
The risk is that courts will apply qualified immunity in First Amendment right-
to-record cases in a similarly officer-protective manner . The Third Circuit in Fields 
concluded that the right to record was not clearly established despite the 
unanimous view of (at the time) five sister circuits and every district court in the 
Third Circuit to consider the question.195 It also refused to accept Philadelphia 
Police Department policies and regulations as a basis for clearly establishing the 
right. In the wake of prior right-to-record decisions, the department adopted 
official policies recognizing a First Amendment right of citizens to record police in 
public; the policy statements sought to eliminate officers’ confusion on the street, 
to ensure officers knew their duties, and to place the department “on the forefront 
rather than on the back end.”196 A Commissioner’s Memorandum stated that 
officers should reasonably expect to be recorded or photographed and that they 
“shall not” obstruct or prevent recording or disable the recording devices.197 But 
the majority emphasized evidence that the policies were ignored, were ineffective in 
informing officers that the constitutional right existed, or were not being followed, 
meaning the existence of the regulations could not show a knowing violation of the 
First Amendment.198 
Despite recent decisions and scholarly consensus, future § 1983 plaintiffs 
seeking damages for the denial of the right to record may encounter a number of 
problems. It is unclear whether six circuits provide a sufficiently “robust” 
consensus199 to clearly establish the right. It is not certain that the right is even 
clearly established in the Third Circuit or the Fifth Circuit (despite the latter’s 
insistence that it was clearly establishing the right “for the future”200), as the 
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Supreme has assumed, but never decided, that a right was clearly established in a 
circuit by a single circuit-court decision.  
Even if sufficient to clearly establish, precedent may lack sufficient factual overlap. 
Distinctions are always possible and seemingly small and insignificant differents 
may be sufficient to avoid liability in a doctrinal morass that one scholar compared 
to the one-bite rule for bad dogs starting over with every change in weather 
conditions.201 
The Third Circuit in Fields found the right to record not clearly established, 
insisting that no part of a broad canvas of existing law and policy allowed the 
defendant officers to understand their conduct to be unlawful. Prior cases 
recognizing the right involved individuals who recorded with the intent to publish 
or use the video, establishing a right different from the one at issue in the current 
case, where the plaintiffs recorded without clear intent to publish.202 The Seventh 
Circuit decision in Alvarez did not provide sufficient notice, as it involved a 
constitutional challenge to an eavesdropping law prohibiting listening and 
recording, without regard to later use or publication of any recording.203 (Jud 
Campbell argues that Alvarez should not be characterized as a right-to-record case, 
because the statute prevented only capture, not dissemination).204 And the Third 
Circuit suggested that there might be a constitutionally meaningful factual 
distinction between recording a traffic stop and recording a sidewalk 
confrontation,205 rendering the right not clearly established in the different context. 
Factual distinctions prevented Turner from clearly establishing much. 
Dissenting, Judge Clement emphasized that the plaintiff had been photographing 
the police station building, which did not clearly establish the right to video-record 
or to record police officers performing police functions.206  
Any First Amendment right also remains subject to reasonable, content-neutral 
time, place, manner restrictions,207 such as the officer’s needs for security and 
safety, for himself and others, in performing public functions. This compels a new 
inquiry in each case into the details of the events at issue and whether the officer 
reasonably could have believed that having someone recording interfered with his 
public duties, compared with previous incidents. 
Even if the plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity and establish liability, a 
plaintiff’s claim that a police officer prevented her from recording or momentarily 
stopped and questioned her actions, although violative of the First Amendment, 
may not produce substantial damages and may leave the plaintiff to recover only 
nominal damages.208 This is especially so in circumstances such as those giving rise 
to Fields and Turner, where no arrest or prosecution followed and any seizure or 
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detention to stop the plaintiff from recording lasted a short time.209 The limited 
remedy may remove the incentive for an individual to bring the lawsuit, especially 
faced with overcoming qualified immunity. Right-to-record plaintiffs would benefit 
from James Pfander’s proposal to allow § 1983 plaintiffs to forego substantial 
damages and limit their claims to nominal damages in exchange for the elimination 
of immunity as a defense.210 And liable officers likely will not pay even that 
nominal-damages judgment, as government indemnify officers in virtually all 
cases.211 
Such disincentives or barriers to successful litigation decrease or limit the 
amount and availability of citizen-controlled video. A determined officer might be 
willing to shut down a person’s recording efforts, allowing him to avoid being 
recorded (while not recording himself) and taking a chance that some legal or 
factual distinction will allow him to avoid liability in the subsequent § 1983 action 
or that any judgment will be de minimis and paid by the municipality rather than out 
of his pocket. 
 
C. Legislative Limitations 
 
Officers are not recording even when required to do so by law or department 
regulation.212 That issue is exacerbated by two policymaking problems. One is 
inconsistency as to the level at which rules and policies should be made—whether 
at the state, municipal, or departmental level, producing piecemeal and confusing 
rules and obligations.213 The second is that those policymakers, whatever their 
level, are enacting insufficiently broad recording policies and excessively narrow 
disclosure policies.214 
Citizen-controlled recording should fill the gap when formal regulations and 
practical conduct combine to limit the amount of video evidence. But the same 
state, local, and departmental legislative efforts that limit the creation and 
availability of police-controlled recording could be aimed at citizen-controlled 
video. 
In 2015, Texas Representative Jason Villalba introduced a bill that would have 
defined the existing crime of interrupting, disrupting, impeding, or interfering with 
a peace officer to include “filming, recording, photographing, or documenting the 
officer within 25 feet of the officer,” or within 100 feet if carrying a gun, with an 
affirmative defense that the recorder was a member of or working for the media.215 
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The obvious target, as the media carve-out demonstrated, was citizens recording 
their police encounters or encounters they witnesses between police and other 
members of the public . 
Such a bill almost certainly violates the First Amendment. It runs afoul of the 
newly recognized right to record, including in the Fifth Circuit. It treats expressive 
conduct less favorably than non-expressive conduct—or, in Jud Campbell’s 
framing, it treats non-expressive conduct that facilitates speech less favorably than 
non-express conduct unconnected to the speech process.216 A person could be 
within 25 feet of a peace officer, even when carrying a gun, if not otherwise 
impeding the officer, so long as not engaged in the (expressive or pre-expressive) 
act of recording; the identical person operating a recording device breaks the law. 
But either person implicates the purported interest in non-interference with police 
functions caused by citizen recording. 
The legislation also treats media members more favorably than non-media 
persons performing the same recording function. It is not clear how a media 
member recording within 20 feet of the officer interferes or impedes more than a 
non-media member in the same place or why media members should be treated 
differently than non-media members engaged in identical expressive (or pre-
expressive) conduct.217 Although the right to record remains subject to content-
neutral time, place, manner restrictions, the special disfavored treatment of citizen-
controlled recording was not neutral as to speaker or content.218 
Villalba withdrew the bill after receiving criticism from everyone on all sides of 
the spectrum.219 But his failed effort does not mean that state, local, or department 
officials lack the identical motivation to protect officers from the perceived 
harassment and negative attention that comes from being subject to constant 
recording,220 or to attempt similar, more competently drafted laws. As long as the 
First Amendment right remains subject to neutral limitations, similar legislative 
efforts can be expected to restrict when or how recording should take place, in 
service of a purportedly neutral value such as non-interference, officer safety, 
public safety, or protection of officer or public privacy.221  
The inquiry does not end with the conclusion that such legislation violates the 
First Amendment in the abstract. The inquiry does not end with the conclusion 
that the purported interests described above are either pretext for government 
wanting to hide matters from public scrutiny or should not be strong enough to 
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justify a ban on public recordings.222 Right-holders must overcome procedural 
hurdles in enforcing and vindicating that right and in obtaining constitutional 
judicial remedies against enforcement of these formal laws, at least without having 
to endure state enforcement and prosecution for attempting to record. 
A person arrested or prevented from recording a police encounter pursuant to 
a formal law or policy prohibiting recording could sue the arresting officer for 
damages for violating her First Amendment rights (the same strategy as those 
prevented from recording by an officer exercising individual discretion). That 
plaintiff confronts the same problems—qualified immunity and the claim not being 
worth significant money to even a prevailing plaintiff able to overcome qualified 
immunity.223 
In fact, this plaintiff encounters a greater qualified-immunity burden, because 
the officer can defend his action on the ground that he was enforcing 
presumptively valid state law224 or department regulation;225 he therefore was 
neither plainly incompetent nor knowingly violating the First Amendment. The 
plaintiff would have to establish that the statute or regulation was obviously and 
blatantly unconstitutional, such that no reasonable officer could have believed the 
recording ban he was enforcing could be valid and enforceable,226 a high burden 
for a plaintiff to satisfy to avoid the officer’s immunity defense. 
A plaintiff might instead sue the municipality, arguing that the officer arrested 
him pursuant to a constitutionally defective formal municipal policy.227 
Municipalities cannot assert immunity defenses,228 so the plaintiff could recover (if 
only nominal damages) for the violation, even if the right was not clearly 
established or if there are factual distinctions between his case and prior cases. But 
if the challenged recording prohibition derived from a state statute (such as 
Villalba’s bill in Texas), the violation in a case of arrest by a municipal or county 
police officer would have been caused by state law, rather than municipal policy.229 
Municipal liability requires that the constitutional violation be caused by the policy 
of that municipality, not the policy of another entity that the municipality enforced. 
A local practice or policy of generally enforcing state law is not sufficient to 
establish liability for its enforcement of any particular constitutionally deficient 
statute. Unless the municipality took additional steps to adopt the state prohibition 
on recording as a municipal ordinance or department regulation or to promulgate a 
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formal policy of enforcing that particular law, it likely is not sufficient to establish 
municipal liability.230 
A third option is a pre-enforcement action against state or local officials to 
enjoin enforcement of the recording ban as violating the First Amendment. But 
pre-enforcement plaintiffs may face standing problems. 
Under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons231 and Clapper v. Amnesty International,232 courts 
are reluctant to accord standing to challenge law-enforcement policies and practices 
that affect individuals only through attempts to enforce other substantive laws 
against them. The plaintiff in Lyons lacked standing to obtain an injunction barring 
city police from employing a constitutionally dubious chokehold in the future, 
because he could not predict if or when he would be stopped by police for a traffic 
or other violation, if or when the encounter would go south, and if or when the 
chokehold would be applied.233 The plaintiffs in Clapper lacked standing to 
challenge a federal law permitting certain national-security surveillance, because 
they could not predict if or when they or people they communicate with would be 
targeted for surveillance, successfully surveilled, and surveilled through the 
challenged law, in government efforts to enforce other federal criminal and 
national-security laws.234 
A prohibition on recording only would be enforced against a person who was 
arrested or seized by an officer and attempted to record their encounter or who 
witnessed another person’s encounter and attempted to record it. Standing would 
require courts to “speculate” that the plaintiff will be seized by police or will 
witness another person being seized by police, that he will try to record the 
encounter, and that he will be prevented from recording the encounter by an 
officer arresting him or otherwise attempting to enforce that statutory recording 
ban.235 A court may be unwilling to accommodate such conjecture in a pre-
enforcement challenge, as opposed to an action in which the police completed the 
violation of the right by preventing recording.236 
Courts may apply more relaxed standing analysis to pre-enforcement First 
Amendment challenges, being more willing to allow plaintiffs to preemptively raise 
their constitution rights, rather than requiring them to engage in the targeted 
expressive (or pre-expressive) conduct and risk arrest and enforcement of the 
constitutionally suspect law.237 But even in First Amendment cases, standing 
requires that the plaintiff have an “intention to engage in a course of conduct 
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and 
                                                     
230 Vives, 524 F.3d at, 351-52, 353; N.N. v. Madison Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 670 F. Supp. 2d 927, 
933-34 W.D. Wis. 2009). 
231 461 U.S. 95 (1983) 
232 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
233 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. 
234 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147-50. 
235 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148-50; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. 
236 Cf. Fields, 862 F.3d at 356. 
237 Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2010). 
there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.”238 A plaintiff must show a 
present intention to engage in the statutorily prohibited expressive activity at a 
specific, imminent future, subjecting himself to likely enforcement. 
The ACLU established standing in Alvarez despite the court recognizing that 
the organization “does not know precisely when it or its employees would face 
prosecution or which officers would be involved.”239 The court did not demand a 
showing of intent to record at any particular imminent protest. It distinguished 
Lyons, because this was not a case in which the threat of prosecution hinged on 
unknowable future events or details of how the violation would occur. The ACLU 
sought to implement an organizational program of recording police at future 
“’expressive activity’ events—protests and demonstrations—in public fora in and 
around the Chicago area.”240 Because the ACLU planned to attend many or all of 
those events as organizational policy and practice and because such events were 
certain to occur, the organization’s activity and the likelihood of enforcement 
moved beyond speculative. 
Media members might be able to establish standing along similar lines. The 
media’s job is to observe, record, and report on public events, so enforcement of 
the statute against them is less speculative; they will report on and attempt to 
record future events such as public protests or rallies at which police might enforce 
the recording ban and those rallies or protests are certain to occur. Of course, 
media organizations and individuals working for media organizations were exempt 
from Villalba’s proposed Texas bill241 and the Illinois law in Alvarez,242 and likely 
would be exempt from similar legislative prohibitions on recording. 
 Jocelyn Simonson’s copwatchers243 also may be able to establish standing. 
They work in organized groups of local residents patrolling neighborhoods in 
planned times, places, and manners, monitoring police conduct, educating citizens, 
and undertaking other efforts to deter police misconduct before it occurs.244 Video-
recording is one recent addition to copwatchers’ repertoire,245 and their recording is 
as deliberate, scheduled, and organized as their patrol activities.246 Like the ACLU 
and the media, their regular organization and consistent activities allow them to 
show the same present intent to record inevitable events on a regular basis through 
their regular planned activities, even if the date or place of the events recorded and 
of enforcement of the law is unknown at the time of litigation. 
Ordinary, spontaneous, individual citizen-recorders working on their own may 
not be so fortunate. They will be less able to show when or where they will be 
involved in or will witness an individual encounter that they want to record, lacking 
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formal job obligations or organizational plans to be at all or any events in which 
recording, and efforts to enforce a recording ban, might occur. Unable to show 
when or where they will want to record an encounter, they will be less able to show 
when or where the recording ban will be enforced against them. Those isolated, 
individual events look more like Lyons and Clapper, where the when and how of a 
future encounter with police and attempted enforcement is less known and more 
speculative or conjectural. 
But the individual right to record police is most essential in these below-the-
radar individual police-public engagements, in which police incentive and power to 
stop a single recording or to arrest a lone recorder are greatest. It is difficult to stop 
dozens of media members or hundreds of protesters with cameras from recording 
a public protest or expressive event (although police in Ferguson certainly tried247), 
other than by halting the protest event, which raises separate, more fundamental 
First Amendment concerns.248 Copwatchers describe a mutual respect between 
themselves and the officers they observe, a sense that both sides are doing their 
jobs, with no sign of officers trying to intimate the watchers or stop their activities, 
including recording.249 Police historically gave media members freer reign in 
covering protests and other events, although some of that deference was lost in the 
Ferguson protests and since.250 
Spontaneous, isolated, and individual recorders do not receive similar respect 
or deference. It is easier for police to prevent a single recorder from capturing a 
single encounter, whether her own or one she happens upon. Yet standing doctrine 
may place these encounters beyond pre-enforcement constitutional challenge. The 
result is a paradox—it is easier for police to enforce an arguably constitutionally 
violative law, but more difficult for plaintiffs to preemptively challenge its 
constitutional validity. 
 
D. The Problem of Officer Discretion 
 
Police-controlled video is marked by two trends: Departments according 
officers discretion as to whether, what, and when to record251 and officers failing to 
follow regulations when required to record.252 The trends are self-reinforcing, as 
the failure to record can be defended as an exercise of discretion. The potential 
limits on citizen recording described above enhance the power of official discretion 
in halting citizen and police recording. 
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It is reasonable to expect that officers would be more likely to fail to record—
intentionally or otherwise, as a matter or discretion or otherwise—an encounter 
that has gone sideways and likely will embarrass the recording officer or his fellow 
officers. Fan gives an example of a 2016 incident in San Francisco, in which 
sheriff’s deputies beat a suspect with metal batons, inflicting head and arm injuries 
requiring twelve days of hospitalization; ten of the eleven involved officers failed to 
activate their bodycams and the one who activated his camera did so by accident.253  
It is similarly reasonable to expect that officers, vested with similar discretion 
by legislation or policy, will be similarly inclined to stop a citizen from recording an 
encounter that has gone sideways, producing video that might embarrass one or 
more of the officers or make them look bad to the viewing public. The unrecorded 
2016 incident in San Francisco came to light only when a private video-security 
system captured the incident, and the owners of the system gave the video to the 
public defender.254 And one can expect that, had the officers been vested with 
power and discretion to stop that recording or its release, they would have 
exercised it. 
The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect executive discretion, to give 
police officers “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,”255 
and to give them wide latitude in the vigorous exercise of that constitutional 
judgment and discretion, rather than forcing them to steer too clear of the 
constitutional line out of fear of liability.256 Legislators such as Rep. Villalba enact 
statutory prohibitions on some recording to vest officers with additional discretion 
and an additional weapon to control citizens and potentially embarrassing video. 
The result undermines the force of citizen-controlled video in establishing or 
restoring a better balance between police and the public in capturing images and in 
ensuring police accountability.257 
It is not clear how First Amendment doctrine might respond to this problem. 
Executive officers cannot wield unbridled and untrammeled enforcement 
discretion with respect to speech, as in granting parade permits.258 But discretion is 
inherent in policing, including as to what laws to enforce, how, and when.259 
Plaintiffs can state a First Amendment claim by showing that adverse police action 
was motivated by animus or disagreement with the message or content of her 
speech and with the intent to stop or retaliate against the speaker because of her 
speech, although pleading and proving intent proves difficult for plaintiffs.260 
Campbell’s framework for protecting speech-facilitating conduct, such as 
recording, can map onto that intent standard, by subjecting to heightened First 
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Amendment scrutiny laws and regulations that target the speech process by 
targeting speech-facilitating activities such as recording for regulation or 
restriction.261  
An officer who wields that discretion to prevent a citizen from recording, 
whether pursuant to a statutory recording ban or his own discretion, targets the 
speech process when he is motivated by concern for, and a desire to stop, video 
that might expose him or his fellow officers acting in constitutionally wrongful, or 
simply embarrassing, ways.262 That standard was satisfied with respect to the events 
underlying Fields, as police in two separate incidents approached both plaintiffs 
with the intent of stopping otherwise-non-interfering recording.263 
Courts overlook content-discriminatory animus in retaliatory-arrest or 
retaliatory-prosecution cases where the officer had probable cause to arrest, 
because the causal connection between animus and injury (the arrest or 
prosecution) becomes more attenuated when probable cause exists.264 Plaintiffs in 
video-recording thus face the same proof problems in showing that the officer 
intended to halt recording to avoid being recorded performing his public functions 
in a way that may subject him to embarrassment or liability, rather because he 
reasonably and with probable cause believed the recording was interfering with 
law-enforcement activities. 
* * * 
Citizen-controlled video, enhanced by a vigorous First Amendment right to 
record government officials performing official functions in public spaces, should 
be the answer to limits on the amount and availability of police-controlled video. 
But procedural realities of qualified immunity, limits on standing, unavailability of 
substantial damages make enforcement of that right difficult, and expansive police 
discretion. And those difficulties together may limit the force of citizen-controlled 
video as a tool for police reform. 
 
IV. Video and Remediation 
 
The significance of video is not limited to litigation or the courtroom; it affects 
how government and the public react to police-public encounters and the public 
policy response to those encounters. The public takes to the streets to protest what 
it perceives as injustice. And the public is more likely to take to the streets when 
people can see and interpret video and when the results of formal legal processes 
do not match their assessments of that video.265 
In responding to incidents of police-involved force, government must account 
for the public’s visceral, brute-sense impressions and interpretations of a video, 
recognizing the Kahan insight that those impressions are determined by identity, 
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ideology, political leanings, demographics, and experience. Regardless of how 
policymakers interpret and understand a recording, they must consider different 
reactions from a public that interprets a recording as showing police misconduct 
and that becomes more outraged if government and government institutions do 
not respond in (what the viewing public regards as) an appropriate fashion.  
Governments respond to video and this concern in several ways. One is to 
attempt to change the laws to keep video from becoming public, thereby limiting 
the public response and public outrage. This explains Jason Villalba’s legislative 
effort to ban citizen recording.266 And it explains efforts to exclude body-camera 
videos from public disclosure laws.267 In 2016, Missouri enacted a broad, blanket 
exemption from its open-records laws for bodycam and dashcam video, 
concluding that making video public would interfere with ongoing police 
investigations.268 That decision followed the state attorney general’s commission 
recommendation that data from any “mobile video recorder” should be classified 
as “closed records,” not subject to public request and accessible only to those 
involved in the incident for purposes of civil litigation or by court order. The 
attorney general warned of technology “lead[ing] to a new era of voyeurism and 
entertainment television at the expense of Missourians’ privacy.”269 
But as Fan argues, blanket, overly broad exemptions from public disclosure 
defeat the basic transparency and accountability goals of police-controlled 
recording.270 Video becomes a tool for protecting and exonerating officers against 
public complaints within the department,271 without allowing the public into the 
conversation to see and decide what happened and what the video reveals. 
Alternatively, government may adopt a one-way disclosure policy, publicizing and 
speaking out about video that (in its view) supports its officers and shows no 
misconduct, while refusing to disclose images and recordings it views (and that the 
public is likely to view) as adverse to police and government interests.272 
A second, more positive, possibility is that public availability of video evidence, 
however created, prompts institutions to be more aggressive in challenging police 
behavior and seeking accountability for misconduct.273 There arguably has been a 
gradual shift in prosecutorial aggressiveness against police violence, especially in 
video cases, moving from the relative dark ages of 2014 to the present. 
NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo was not indicted for the 2014 strangulation 
death of Eric Garner,274 and Cleveland police officers Timothy Loehmann and 
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Frank Garmback were not indicted in the 2014 shooting death of Tamir Rice,275 
despite widely circulated video (from non-police sources) of both incidents. But 
more recent cases have resulted in criminal charges and prosecutions—Ray 
Tensing in the shooting death of Samuel DuBose at the University of Cincinnati,276 
Yeonimo Yanez in the shooting death of Philando Castile in Minnesota,277 Jason 
Stockley in the shooting death of Anthony Lamar Smith in St. Louis, and Philip 
Brailsford in the shooting death of Daniel Shaver in Mesa, Arizona.278 Charges 
remain pending against multiple Chicago police officers for the 2015 shooting 
death of Laquan McDonald, where dashcam video, produced only after a state-
court suit and order compelling disclosure, helped expose an attempted cover-
up.279 A hung jury in the state homicide prosecution of Michael Slager in the 
shooting of Walter Scott in South Carolina led to a federal civil-rights280 
prosecution of Slager for depriving Scott of his Fourth Amendment rights, a guilty 
plea, and a twenty-year prison sentence.281  
The results of these cases may not reflect positive outcomes or what many 
regard, based on their interpretation of the video, as justice. Each prosecution in 
the first list was unsuccessful, resulting in acquittals or hung juries (sometimes 
multiple hung juries). Only Slager seems likely to serve prison time. But the 
increased efforts suggest some limited movement toward success. State and federal 
prosecutors appear more likely to pursue criminal charges when video evidence, at 
least viscerally, supports a view that the officer did something wrong. 
Unfortunately, acquittals accompanied by graphic video, such as in the Shaver 
shooting, reinforce the public belief that nothing is sufficient to convict a police 
officer.  
Bryce Newell describes an irony to this evolution. The demand for body-cams 
and video, including among police officers, began following the unrecorded 
shooting of Michael Brown. Subsequent cases featured video of some sort from 
some source, resulting in prosecutions but not necessarily accountability, while 
turning rank-and-file law enforcement off to cameras.282 
A third possibility is that video of a police-citizen incident may prompt 
municipalities to settle civil-rights suits more promptly to avoid further public 
viewing, discussion, and debate over video that is subjectively perceived as 
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troubling and to avoid the potential for anger erupting into public 
demonstrations.283 
Public attention and outrage over a viral video puts government on its heels 
and prompts action; it must defend its officers while also reacting to adverse public 
perceptions and conclusions. The result is a split response—no criminal, 
administrative, or employment actions against the officers, but settlement as the 
path of least resistance in civil litigation. The families of Scott, McDonald, Garner, 
DuBose, and Castile settled with the officers and municipalities for anywhere from 
$3 million to $6.5 million, often before or just after filing the lawsuit,284 even while 
the officers in each case escaped criminal punishment.  
Katherine MacFarlane describes these civil cases as utilizing “accelerated civil 
rights settlement.”285 Plaintiffs bring or threaten bring small-bore § 1983 claims; 
they seek only damages for the single event at issue, rather than systemic 
departmental reform through broad injunctive relief; and the parties settle before 
or shortly after filing.286 While these lawsuits do not achieve systemic police 
reform—as would a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin a department’s stop-and-frisk 
policy287—the settlements are with the municipality (rather than the officers288) and 
are sufficiently substantial that the numbers might begin to add-up and prompt 
policy reform to avoid future lawsuits and payments.289 Video, and government 
fear of the public reaction to video that looks “bad” prompts it to pursue or accept 
accelerated settlement and to end the legal dispute, and with it the popular 
conversation and controversy around the video and the problematic police 
encounter. 
A final, ironic, option is for government to undertake the difficult task of 
explaining to the public that it should not jump to conclusions about what 
happened because video is incomplete, non-objective, subject to the limits of the 
video frame, and open to varying interpretations based on the viewer’s political and 
personal perspectives. Officials can urge the public to accept that one video does 
not tell the whole story and to wait until they see and hear more video, more 
evidence, and more sides to the story. But if the public’s brute-sense impression is 
that the video is unfavorable to the police, as was the case in the settled high-
profile death cases, this may prove practically and politically impossible.290 This 
tactic also contradicts the government position, in and out of litigation, when 
officials are confident in video’s officer-supportive message—then they insist that 
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video is singular, conclusive, objective, unambiguous, and tells one story that 
exonerates the officer on summary judgment291 or that justifies not pursuing 
criminal charges against the officer. The cognitive dissonance and charges of 
hypocrisy may be too much too overcome. 
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